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IN DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIAN ACADEMIC UNIONISM
Grahame McCulloch
Union of Australian College Academics

INTRODUCTION
This paper does not aspire to be an objective
account of academic unionism. It is written from
my perspective as a committed union activist, and
comes at a time when there is a real prospect of a
substantial erosion of the role and authority of
Australia's academic unions. I refer, of course, to
the well publicised plans of Professor David
Penington (Vice-Chancellor of the University of
Melbourne and immediate Past President of the
Australian Higher Education Industrial
Association (AHEIA), the national university
employers' body) and Dr David Kemp
(Liberal/National Party Shadow Federal
Education Minister). Professor Penington and Dr
Kemp have developed a model of academic
industrial relations in which working conditions
would be radically deregulated, and in which
unions would be given only a limited role. They
see unionism as responsible for the debasement of
collegial life in our universities, and see Statel
regulation of academic working conditions as an
erosion of university autonomy. State intrusion,
the argument goes, has imposed a rigid and
uniform labour code and has served academics
badly.
This paper is something of a defence against these
charges. Its bulk consists of some observations
about the emergence of mass higher education in
the last 30 years, and the change this has
engendered in the rela tionships between
universities, their academic staff and the State.
The account underlines that the emergence of
academic unionism is a response to, rather than a
cause of, the erosion of the traditional 'liberal'
conception of higher education, and the rise of the
managerial ethos in Australian academe. I
suggest that this has been an international
phenomenon and that senior leaders of higher
education have been quite prepared to support
selective State intervention when it suits their
managerial purpose.
In the latter part of the paper I briefly survey the
recent achievements of Australian academic
unions and conclude that the proposals of Dr
Kemp and Professor Penington should not be
supported.
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Three disclaimers are necessary. First, the general
thesis set out is based primarily on my own
experiences of the last 15 years and is not
intended to be a scholarly account. For those with
an intellectual interest in academic unionism I
have, however, provided appropriate notes and
references. Second, although I have introduced a
comparative element into the discussion, my
treatment of overseas developments is really only
the beginning of what needs to be a more detailed
investigation. Finally, the paper does not look at
the cultural dimensions of academic labour's
evolution. This is obviously an important issue as
it bears directly on the relationship between
academic life, civil society and the State which in
turn helps to define the self-consciousness of
academic labour. But I will leave that question to
the sociologists and philosophers!
FROM AN ELITE TO A MASS SYSTEM OF
HIGHER EDUCATION
A Note on International Developments
Much of the public comment generated by the
establishment of Australia's Unified National
System of Higher Education (UNS) and the
accompanying (and not always unworthy)
demonization of former Federal Education
Minister John Dawkins pays too little attention to
the origins of today'S Australian higher education
sector. The shape of the system owes as much to
State intervention by successive Governments in
the 1950s, 1990s and 1990s as it does to John
Dawkins and the State intervention of the late
1980s. Moreover, there are parallels between the
evolution of Australian universities and those of
Western Europe and North America.
The 30 year period immediately following the
Second World War was marked throughout the
Western World by enormous industrial and
economic reconstruction and growth, by rising
populations and by rising standards of living.
Amidst this economic boom higher education
was profoundly transformed by the twin
pressures of rising social demand for access to
universities, and by the seemingly insatiable
demand of industry and external labour markets
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fOf ever increasing numbers of specialists and
technicians.

ulliversities all unqualified right to determine
either the size of their illtakes or their sources
and level offinance

There was an explosion in student numbers and
an enormous growth in the level of financial
support for higher education throughout Western
Europe and North America. A substantial
increase in the cost of higher education arose not
only from quantitative growth but also from
changes in the way in which higher education
was delivered. Larger institutions emerged, there
was a proliferation of specialist discipline and
institution types, and capital and equipment
outlays were increased enormously to maintain
and extend research and teaching infrastructure
in an undifferentiated fashion across most
disciplines areas. This shift to a higher cost
structure impinged on both public and private
higher education institutions and remains a
common feature of higher education systems in
the developed world today.

(Fulton, 1982, p. 5).

The long boom in higher education was
underpinned, even in the most free-market
systems of the US and Japan, by extensive State
intervention in the form of public grants and
subsidies and by an increasing State authority
over planning. In Western Europe the character
of State intervention was overtly based on the
direct centralised development of a fully public
system, whilst in the US decentralised State
authority performed the dual purpose of
providing expanded public facilities and
intervening to rescue the mass private higher
education sector which was on the verge of
collapse following market failure in the 1960s
(Geiger, R. 1986 and Fulton, O. et al., 1982).
With the growth of higher education and the rise
of State intervention came substantial changes to
the traditional conception of the independent
rights of universities. An ILO Report described
the change in this way:

... in the postwar period nearly all coulltries have
trallsformed their institutiolls of higher
educatioll from autollomous or semiautollomous ellterprises, with cOllsiderable
freedom offillaltcialmallagemellt alld cOlltrol of
access, to members of a system, at least partly
ce1ltrally plan lied and fillallced alld bearillg a
very differellt relationships to the State (and to
each other) from that of the university ideal of
previous cellturies. This trallsformatioll has, of
course, taken place to different extellts alld with
differe1lt degrees of deliberateness, in different
coulltries ... but there are IlO coulltries for whom
the cOllcept of academic freedom still gives
Vol. 17, No. 2,1992

The same report describes the shift from 'elite' to
'mass' higher education and the structural change
it produced:

When more than a small proportion of the
[population] has access to the higher educatioll
syste1ll its institutions inevitably challge
character ill mallY different ways. These
changes generally illclude both the origins alld
destinations of graduates, the amoullt of
resources expended on teaching and hence the
kind and quality of instruction and, indeed, the
structure of higher education... Sooner or later,
it becomes impossible to cOlltinue to expalld
universities of the 'elite' type, and new
illstitutions develop ... the pressures of growth
and differentiation seem to lead to three
develop11te1tts: an expansion of nOIl-university
higher education; later, a telldency to merge
ulliversity alld nOIHlIliversity forms into more
flexible, comprehensive institutions and an
ill creased emphasis Oil part-time higher
educatioll
(Fulton, 1982, p. 11).
Although these developments threatened the
traditional conception of universities in many
ways - by blurring the traditional distinction
between 'liberal' education and vocational
education, by merging previously distinct
professional cultures, by eroding university
independence from the State and by allowing
economic forces to shape curricula and the
pattern of provision - they were in general
supported by the leaders of higher education
institutions throughout Western Europe and
North America. In an environment of ever
expanding resources concerns about the pure
ideals of the Academy being diluted were
outweighed by the tangible benefits of growth .
The same was true for the academic staff. The
long boom was characterised by excess demand
for qualified staff with academics consequently
being guaranteed substantially rising standards
of living and almost unlimited access to
promotion and to research funds. In the US the
demand for available faculty members actually
outpaced the number of trained professionals
during the 1950s and 1960s. The demand for
faculty members above simple replacement needs
stood at 27,500 per year by the late 1960s (Shaw,
1985, p. 11). US academic salaries increased
55
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sharply by 75% in real terms between 1959 a~d
1969 (Drescher and Polishook, 1985), whIle
between 1967 and 1973 academic salaries
increased in real terms by 16% in the UK and 29%
in NZ (Marginson, 1989, p. 20).
A Note on Australian Developments
The trends in Western Europe and North America
were also reflected in Australia during the postSecond World War period, although arguably
with some lag. Higher education expanded
dramatically throughout the late 1950s, 1960s and
the early 1970s with the student population more
than trebling and the proportion .of gross
domestic product allocated to educahon more
than doubling (Senate, 1982, p. 43).
Accompanying this spectacular growth were
increased State intervention, moves towards
central planning and the establishment and
subsequent consolidation of whole new sectors of
the system. The recommendations of the Murray
Report in 1957 laid the basis for the establishment
of the Australian Universities Commission (AUC)
by the Menzies Government in 1959, and for the
subsequent provision of direct triennial grants ~o
universities by the Commonwealth. The Martlll
Report of 1964, following a three year review, was
the foundation for the establishment of the
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on
Advanced Education which subsequently became
the Advanced Education Commission (AEC)
(Birch and Smart, 1977 and Harman and Smart,
1982). The provision of direct grants to the States
for advanced education in 1965, and the
subsequent rapid growth of the sector, parallelled
the development of non-university higher
education provision in Western Europe and North
America. The Martin Report also unsuccessfully
recommended the establishment of a unitary
national planning body for universities. and
colleges - it was to be another 13. years unhl !he
Fraser Government finally consohdated plannmg
for both sectors under the umbrella of the Tertiary
Education Commission (TEC), and to be a further
12 years before the move ~owards comprehensive
institutions occurred WIth the release of the
Dawkins'1988 White Paper. This shift was already
apparent in much of Europe and the US in the
mid-to-Iate 1970s. Australia reflects the longevity
of its Anglophile roots in this respect. Alon~ with
the UK, Australia maintained a rigid bmary
divide between advanced education and
universities until the late 1980s although there
was nonetheless considerable merger activity in
the UKin the early 1980s (Meek, 1988, pp. 159-70).
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The most dramatic expression of centralisation
and State intervention in Australia was the
assumption in 1973 ?f fu~l Common,:"ealth
responsibility for fundmg hl~her educahon - a
decision which fatally undermmed the long term
planning role of State Go~e.r~ents and gave the
national Government deCISIve mfluence.
Although, like their overseas counterparts, some
Australian university and college leaders and
academic staff had reservations about the extent
of State intervention and the scale of expansion narrow ins trumenta lis m, declining academic
standards, concern about autonomy and so on they on the whole supported the proc~ss and
reaped substantial immediat~ materIal and
academic rewards (WheelWrIght, 1965 and
Bessant, 1982, pp. 26-33). As early as 1952 in a
pamphlet titled A Crisis ill the Finance alld
Development of Australian Uni~ersities the
Australian Vice-Chancellors CommIttee (AVCC)
gave support to national rather than regional
planning of universities, and to a much expanded
Commonwealth funding role (Birch and Smart,
1977, pp. 124-5). Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and
early 1970s compromises were reached which
enabled the State to use universities and colleges
to achieve its social and economic objectives
while universities were able to rely on the State as
a benevolent patron which could be trusted to
defend the traditional liberal and scholarly
foundations of higher education. Planning
authorities within the State apparatus - the
various
Commissions
and
later
the
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission
(CTEC) - were largely run and organised by
senior university leaders and were able to
function without interference from other
Government agencies. The State relied on
politically astute Vice-Chancellors to ~esp?nd to
Government priorities without overt dIrection. In
turn this 'arm's length' relationship provided the
Vice-Chancellors with privileged access to
decision-makers within the State apparatus.
The pace of Australian expansi~:m in the 196~s .and
1970s brought with it the famihar characterIsti~ of
excess demand for academic labour, accompamed
by rising academic. ~alaries and ~ubstantial
promotion opportumtIes for academIC staff. In
the decade from 1966-1975 the average salary of
an Australian senior lecturer increased by 23.7%
in real terms (Marginson, 1989, p. 16), and the
prospects for appointment and promotion were
so good in the 1960s and early 1970s that
Professor Geoffrey Harcourt was later to say:
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... because of the expansion ill the 1960s, ...
people of my age for example, 'Who 'Were lu~ky
enough to be bom at the he.ig.'lt of th~ depress 1011
and then just come to frultlOll III tllne to teach
the baby boo Ill, have had roses, roses all the 'Way
(Senate, 1982, p. 43).
THE END OF THE BOOM
competing Interests in a New System
The benefits of the long boom in higher education
those
t
.
and the relative comfort it engendered
. for
working in the system masked emergmg enslO~s
within and between universities, their academIC
staff and the State.
The expansion had prod'7ced.perm~nent internal
changes to higher education, mcludmg:
• A more direct connection between institutions
and business/industry, including the
expansion of external ~epresenta.tion on~ and
involvement in, the declslOn-makmg bodIes of
universi ties.
• An expansion of internal democracy with
greater levels of participatory go~ernan~e
inside universities and colleges - thIS was m
large measure a response t? the intelle~tual
and political discontent whIch swept hIgher
education in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
• An increase in the non-research effort of
universities
focussed
primarily
on
undergraduate teaching arising from the
explosion in social demand.
• Expansion
of
vocationa.l/profes~ional
education and a consequent mcrease m ~h~
numbers of academic staff without an a prIOrI
commitment to the liberal ideal of the
university.
• An increase in the internal complexity of
institutions and an associated growth in the
internal central bureaucracy based on a layer
of professional managers, administrative
officers and the like.
• Academic staff acquired 'mass' labour
functions, and were required to respond to an
increasingly differentiated clientele as a result
of expanded undergraduate enrolm~~ts and
an increased emphasis on proVISIOn of
opportunities for the socially disadvantaged.
Academics had been transformed from
autonomous professionals into white collar
wage and salary earners, although many were
not yet conscious of this.
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Universities had become big businesses within
themselves. This involved a significant erosion of
both the conservative vision of universities
(Newman's Idea and the 'community of schol~rs')
and the radical vision of universities as pOSSIble
agents of revoluti~mar):' c~a~ge throug~ the
transmission of anh-capltahst Ideas. PartIcular
institutions might still pursue these visions, and
within institutions particular d~partments or
disciplines might uphold these perspectives: But
the higher education system as ~ whole, m ~ll
developed countries, had acqUlr~d (and .stlll
retains) broader economic and SOCIal functlOns
based on more utilitarian imperatives. The end of
the boom brought this fact into sharp relief.
The world-wide downturn of capitalism in the
mid 1970s was accompanied by a sharp rise in
inflation throughout the developed world, ~nd a
universal fiscal crisis of the State. The cessatIon of
economic growth and burgeoning budget deficits
forced Governments of all political persuasions to
sharply reduce public expenditure. For higher
education systems throughout Europe, Nor!h
America and Australia this meant a rapId
deterioration of their financial position and, for
the first time, intensive external and internal
competition for funds. !he problem was
compounded by demographIC factors. The po~t
war baby-boom had dissipated and SOCIal
demand for higher education levelled off.
Declining enrolments coincided with the financial
squeeze.
This sparked tension within and ?~tween
institutions and their staff as competitIOn for
access to scarce resources intensified. Consensus
decision-making and a sense of common purpose
began to break down as institutions s.ought to
balance competing interests. These mcluded
choices between:

•
•
•
•
•

'excellence' or universal access
liberal arts or science/professions
concentrated or generalised research funding
teaching and research effort
differentiation or comprehensivity in
distributing funding reducti<?ns within
individual universities and faculties.
(Lourens, 1990, pp. 218-231)

The attempted resolution of these contradictions
transformed the most senior academics from
scholarly leaders with adn:inistr~tiv~ functions
into academic managers WIth obhgatIons to the
corporate objectives of institutional central
bureaucracy, as well as to a broad external
57
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constituency encompassing the business sector
and representatives of the State. From this
process merged the explicit shift to concern with,
and the implementation of policy around the
concepts of productivity, efficiency and
accountability. These had become central to the
language of internal and external debate about
universities around the world by the mid 1980s.
The academic labour market moved rapidly from
excess demand to excess supply with consequent
reductions in real academic salaries, intense
competition for new appointments and the
drying-up of promotion opportunities for young
and enthusiastic academics. Like the earlier
parallels of the period of growth there are some
similarities between Australia, Western Europe
and the US.
US academic salaries fell 20.5% between 1971 and
1982, compared to a drop of only 4.3% for
comparable occupations. Faculty salaries did not
creep ahead of inflation until 1983 and this
advance was due not to increases in salaries, but
rather to a sharp decline in the inflation rate
(Shaw, 1985, p.10). A US commentator describes
the tale of an ageing academic staff structure and
its consequences for promotion in the early 1980s
climate of no growth:

... changes in faclllty demography left America's
colleges and universities with a large proportion
offaculty members, tmured and in their middle
forties and fifties, who will not retire for another
15 or 20 years ... these demographic conditions,
coupled with retrenchments, have meant a sharp
decrease in the 1ll1mber of available jobs for the
new PhD and few, if any, promotional
opportunities for young faculty. The crunch is
felt disproportionately by women and minority
faculty who did IlOt begin to enter the system in
significant numbers until the late 1970s
(Shaw, 1985, p. 11).
In the UK the onset of stagnation saw real
academic salaries fall by 16.3% between 1973 and
1985 (Marginson, 1989, p. 20). The number of full
time teaching and research staff in British
universities fell from 43,017 in 1980-81 to 41,994 in
1982-83 while 1,134 full-time academic posts were
lost in the polytechnic sector over the same
period. This, combined with an academic 'age
bulge', limited access to promotion, made the
appointment of young full-time tenured staff
increasingly difficult, and saw a significant rise in
the use of part-time academic staff (Farnham,
1985).

58

Australian /oumal afTeadlcr Education

Australian academic salaries also declined during
this period. Between 1973 and 1985 real wages for
a senior lecturer fell by 15.3% (Marginson, 1988, p.
11), a trend which was accompanied by riSing
undergraduate teaching loads and declining
relative staff numbers. In 1979 there were 90
academic staff per thousand students. By 1983
there were only 82 academic staff per thousand
students (McCulloch et al., 1984 p. 13). Low
academic staff separation rates and the fact that
over 70% of academic staff were under the age of
45 in 1980 meant that new appointment and
promotion opportunities dried up.
The Rise of Managerialism
A new managerialism asserted itself vigorously in
dealing with the labour market and policy
dilemmas generated by the end of higher
education's long boom. University managers and
notionally independent buffer bodies within the
State apparatus were increasingly active in
proposing adjustment mechanisms which
affected the vital economic and intellectual
interests of academic staff. These included
successful and unsuccessful attempts to reduce
the incidence of tenure, to establish retrenchment
and redundancy provisions, to create larger
numbers of junior teaching only positions and to
increase workloads.
Such an agenda was incompatible with the
collegial governance structure of universities
which had been strengthened by the earlier
period of substantial growth and expansion.
Hence at the end of the long boom institutional
management and the State moved to dilute
democratic processes inside universities and
colleges and to rely instead on strategic planning
and management by objectives as decisionmaking techniques.
In the US this change has been described as:

... an institutional drift from faculty to
centralised control [where] ... administrators
have adopted management strategies which
reduce costs by increasing administrative
control. 'Laissez1aire campus administration',
the administrative model most compatible with
the academic inyth, has been replaced by
[strategies] that rely on control, planning,
evaluation and reallocation to promote
institutional strength within financial
constraints. This centralised control undercuts
the autonomy, collegia/ity and shared
govemance that is central to the myth of

academe ... FacuIty senates, which increased in
number and ill promillellce duri/lg the late
1960s and 1970s, have proved llllable to either
reassert afaCility role in administrative decisionmaking or recreate a shared collegial decisionmaking st1'llcture. Several major studies of
facuIty senates have shown that in most cases
the facuIty senate role in govemance is
supeljicial, insignificant, and advisory only.
Even where faculty senates do exercise
authority, that authority does IlOt extend to
hiring, firillg, promotion, and tenure
(Shaw, 1985, p. 12).
In Britain the Jarret report, relying heavily on
commissioned studies by the UK Committee of
Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP),
recommended in late 1985 major changes to the
internal structures of institutions including the
development of strategic plans, the establishment
of university planning and resource committees
of 'strictly limited size', the appointment of heads
of department by council only on the
recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor, the
categorisation of the Vice-Chancellor as chief
executive and manager and a reduction in the
size, frequency and number of committees. These
changes involved shifts in the distribution of
authority within institutions - a process described
by a British commentator in the following way:

... institutional emphasis on orgallisational
efficiency and managerial control [affected]
conditions of service, class contact hours and
staff workloads ... with implications for both
management and academic staff. It affects the
role of heads of departments, deans offacuIties
and other senior institutional office holders such
as IlIliversity vice-cllallcellors. They become
increasingly managers of institutional resources,
including academic staff rather thall academic
leaders, general admillistrators and institutiOlwl
spokespeople
(Farnham, 1985, p. 58).
These managerial preoccupations were echoed in
Australia by the recommendations of the 1988
White Paper which included proposed reductions
in the size of governing bodies, calls for what it
described as 'strong managerial' modes of
operation and the requirement for institutions to
establish educational profiles (Dawkins, 1988, p.
103). What is commonly overlooked in much of
the response to these aspects of Dawkins'
proposals is that in substance similar
recommendations emerged earlier in 1985 from
the allegedly more independent CTEC. In its
Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness CTEC

recommended the abolition of elected Deans and
Heads of School and an increased emphasis on
selection of senior academics using management
criteria. It also commented favourably on
majority external representation on university
councils and recommended punitive changes to
academic conditions of employment including
increased use of contract labour, the introduction
of redundancy and the establishment of
reversionary tenure positions, as well as the
development of performance indicators
(Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission,
1986, Chapters 5-6). Moreover, these proposals
were simply the last in a long line of State or
management inspired attempts to change
conditions of employment dating back to the late
1970s. Others included CTEC's 1978 review of
study leave, the establishment of the 1981 Inquity
into Academic Tenure by the Australian Senate
(during which the AVCC and CTEC supported
the introduction of retrenchment for tenured
academics), staff cutbacks following the 1981/82
bout of forced college mergers and ongoing
support by CTEC and the AVCC for an increased
use of junior contract labour (McCulloch, 1985
and Muffet, 1986, p. 111).
THE EMERGENCE OF ACADEMIC

UNIONISM
Thus at the end of higher education's long boom
academic staff were besieged by multiple
pressures, including:
•

Declining material rewards and in particular a
decline in salaries relative to other unionized
professionals such as teachers and public
servants.
• A new and alien managerial culture.
• Reduced promotion opportunities and the
real or perceived threat of redundancy or
retrenchment arising from financial pressures.
• Increased competition with colleagues and
with other universities and colleges for
students, research opportunities and grants.
• An increase in the routine character of much
of academic labour, particularly in teaching
and administration at undergraduate level.
• An erosion of discretionary academic labour
time.
In short, to coin a Marxist phrase, academics had
been proletarianized by the emergence of mass
higher education. The idealist view of academics
as 'members of unique University communities
where employer-employee relations existed, but
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were subservient to the pursuit of the common
endeavour within those communities' (O'Brien,
1992, p. 2) was increasingly at odds with the dayto-day realities of academic life. Academics
turned to unionism as a vehicle for defending
their collective interests.
A Note on US Experience
The trend towards academic unionism appears to
have been international in character. From the
mid 1970s the Canadian Association of University
Teachers (CAUT) substantially increased its
authority and involvement in collective
bargaining, while in the UK the Association of
University Teachers increasingly sought a central
negotiating role on salaries, tenure and promotion
issues, as well as affiliating with the British Trades
Union Congress (TUC) (National Education
Association, 1985, Chapter 3).
The US experienced a huge upsurge in
unionisation amongst academic staff from the
mid 1960s through to the early 1980s. The US
industrial relations system requires union
bargaining units to be organised at institutional
level with local unions seeking certification (or
registration) from appropriate state authorities.
In the public sector bargaining agents seek legal
status under distinct legislation established by
each of the State legislatures. In the private sector
bargaining units are governed by the National
Labour Relations Act and bargaining is overseen
by the National Labor Relations Board, a quasijudicial administrative agency with regional
bureaucracies (Spitzberg, 1984, p. 102).
Bargaining agents are able to obtain legally
binding industrial contracts with codify
employment conditions for a fixed term.
The magnitude of expansion of academic
unionism can be gauged from the following table
which traces the growth in certified academic
bargaining units in the US higher education
system.
Studies in the US reveal that this growth
coincided with the onset of stagnation in higher
education and that the tendency towards
unionism has been stronger at lower levels of the
hierarchy and is (not surprisingly) inversely
related to the level of job satisfaction and to the
level of genuine participatory democracy in the
academic workplace (Foster, 1976 and National
Education Association, 1985, pp. 17-30). The
growth has also been affected by the highly
competitive nature of academic unionism in the
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US, and has varied according to the culture and
status of the colleges and universities within
which academics work. The largest and most
explicitly industrial organisation in higher
education is the American Federation of Teachers
(AFT) which represents around 43% of unionized
academics and has extensive links with the
organised labour movement. The American
Association of University Professors (AAUP),
formed in 1916 as a professional body for
professors, has around 90,000 members and acts
as a collective bargaining agent, although its
perspective on industrial unionism remains
ambivalent. The National Education Association
(NEA), similar in orientation to the AAUP, also
plays a role in both the professional and industrial
arenas. These national bodies do not act as the
direct collective bargaining agent - this is carried
out by local faculty or regional organisations
which are affiliated with one of the AFT, AAUP or
NEA. Competition between these unions is
maintained through the requirement that
academic staff periodically "elect" (via a ballot) a
local bargaining agent to represent them. These
"elections", and many industrial disputes, often
encourage alliances between two of the three
national organisations in order to secure
majorities. At the University of Pittsburgh, for
example, the local bargaining agent is jointly
affiliated with the AFT and the AAUP (Elam and
Moskow, 1969; Spitzberg, 1984; Taskunas, 1981;
and Drescher and Polishook, 1985).
These unions now represent around 200,000 US
academic staff (with 80% of unionists being in the
public sector) and appear to have played a
significant role in gaining higher minimum salary
rates for union members than non-union
members in the public system. Tables 2 and 3
compare and contrast unionized and nonunionized salaries in US public higher education
system by classification and discipline area. The
figures are quite impressive - across all grades
unionized salaries are 16.5% higher than salaries
at non-unionized institutions, and across the key
discipline areas are between 9% and 25% higher
(with the notable exception of business and
management).

TABLE 1: NUMBER OF TEACHING STAFF BARGAINING UNITS IN US HIGHER EDUCATION
SYSTEM
1966

11

1970

160

1974

360

1967

25

1971

230

1980

427

1968

65

1972

290

1986

1969

130

1973

330

(Taskunas, 1981, p. 154 and National Centre for Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education,
1987)
TABLE 2: DIFFERENCES IN U.S. SALARIES FOR UNIONIZED AND NON-UNIONIZED
ACADEMIC STAFF (AVERAGES OF WHOLE U.S. PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR
1989/90)
CLASSIFICATION

Professor
Associate
Professor
Assistant
Professor
New Assistant
Professor
Instructor
ALL RANKS

UNIONIZED
SALARY
(AVERAGE)
$US

NON-UNIONIZED
SALARY
(AVERAGE)
$US

DIFFERENCE

50,871
40,996

45,323
37,259

12.2
10.0

33,397

31,294

6.7

30,642

25,137

21.9

25,773
42,680

24,214
46,649

6.4
16.5

(National Education Association, 1991, pp. 17-20)
TABLE 3: DIFFERENCE IN U.S. ACADEMIC SALARIES FOR UNIONIZED AND NONUNIONIZED ACADEMIC STAFF (AVERAGES OR WHOLE U.S. PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
SECTOR, DISCIPLINE BY DISCIPLINE, 1989/90)
DISCIPLINE

Social Sciences

Some caution is required in placing too much
weight on this data as it excludes consideration of
the very large US private education sector. Some
estimates suggest the difference may be little
more than 5% when private institutions are
included. Unionization in the private sector has
declined since a 1980 US Supreme Court Decision
in the case of Yeshiva University v the NatiOltal
Labour Relations Board (Supreme Court, 1980).

UNIONIZED
SALARY
(AVERAGE)
$US

NON-UNIONIZED
SALARY
(AVERAGE)
$US

DIFFERENCE

41,614
49,845
43,555

34,865
45,724
43,481

19.36
9.01
0.17

41,793
41,245
46,309
37,545
40,874
45,635
45,183

35,658
32,868
38,778
30,874
33,563
39,910
38,507

17.21
25.49
19.42
21.61
21.51
14.34
17.34

(National Education Association, 1991, pp. 17-20)
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The case is worth examining as it says much
about the relationship between collegial
governance and academic unionism. At issue
was an application filed by the Yeshiva University
Faculty Association (Union) with the National
Labor Relations Board seeking certification as a
bargaining agent for full-time academic staff,
following a vote by the academics to support the
Union claim. The University opposed the
application on the grounds that academic staff
participation in the governance of the University
gave them a 'managerial' role, and that the
relevant statute did not allow 'managerial
employees' union rights. Although the Labor
Relations Board rejected this argument the
University won an appeal in the Supreme Court.
The Court held by a 5-4 margin that:

... authority in the typical 'mature' private
university is divided between a central
administration and one or more collegial bodies.
This system of shared authority evolved from tile
medieval model of collegial decision-making in
which the guilds of scholars were responsible
only to themselves ... [these] traditions continue
to play a significant role ... principles developed
for use in the industrial setting cannot be
imposed blindly on the academic world... The
controlling consideration is that the Faculty
exercise authority at Yeshiva which is
unquestionably managerial. Their authority in
academic matters is absolute [including] ...
teaching methods, grading and ... 011 occasion
the size of the student body ... the faculty at each
school make recommendations to the Dean or
Director in every case offacuIty hiring, tenure,
sabbaticals, termination and probation
(Supreme Court, 1980, pp. 857/861).
For many observers the Court's decision was
tinged with an air of unreality given the actual
distribution of authority within modern
universities. This point was not lost on the
Court's dissenting minority which, led by Justice
Brennan said:

... the task of operating the university enterprise
has beell transformed from the faculty to an
autonomous administration which faces the
same pressures to cut costs and increase
efficiencies that confront any large industrial
organisation. The past decade of budgetary
cutbacks, declinillg ellrolmellts, reductiolls ill
further appoilltmellts, curtailment of academic
programs, alld illcreasillg calls for accoulltability
to alullmi alld other special illterest groups has
only added to the erosioll of the faculties' role in
institutiolls decision-making process. ... what
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the Court fails to apprehelld is that whatever
influence the facuIty wields ill univerSity
decision-making is attributable solely to its
collective expertise as professional educators,
and not to ally managerial prerogatives ... the
administration may attempt to defer to the
faculty's competence whellever possible, but it
must and does apply its own distinct perspective
to those recommendations, a perspective which is
based Oil fiscal and other managerial policies
which the faculty has no part in developillg ...
The very fact that Yeshiva's facuIty has voted for
the Union indicates that the faculty does not
perceive its interests to be aligned with those of
management ... The Court's conclusion that the
faculty's
professional
interests
are
indistinguishable from those of the
administration is bottomed 011 an idealised
model of collegial decision-making that is a
vestige of the great medieval university. But the
university of today bears little resemblance to the
'community of scholars' of yester-year
(Supreme Court, 1980, pp. 870/872/873).
Although Yeshiva has been used by American
higher education employers to stymie the further
development of private sector academic unionism
during the 1980s its precedent value may not
stand the ultimate test of time. Its application has
generated some untenable contradictions. The
US journal Academe reported in 1987 on a major
dispute between the American Association of
University Professor (AAUP) and Fairleigh
Dickinson University.
An agreement was
established in 1984 which, amongst other things,
guaranteed a faculty role in the appointments of
Chairs, Deans and committees. As the agreement
neared expiry the University made application to
have the AAUP local decertified - using the
Yeshiva precedent the University argued that the
faculty were 'managerial' in exercising a formal
role in appointments. The AAUP local was
decertified and without formal bargaining power
the academics lost the legal 'managerial' rights
upon which the University based its case!
(McDonald, pp. 20-4). There are some signs that
Yeshiva is being questioned by lower courts and
authorities. In 1991 an AFT / AAUP local won a
major victory in a dispute with the University of
Pittsburgh about the refusal of the university
management to bargain over a new industrial
contract.
Management relied on Yeshiva's
'managerial' formulation but the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board ruled that only a minority
of faculty were allowed to participate in the
collegial process, that faculty authority was
limited to academic matters (not budgets or
staffing) and that decisions of participatory
Vol. 17 No. 2, 1992

bodies were recommendatory only (American
Federation of Teachers, 1991, pp. 8-9).
Studies appear to indicate that US academic
unionism has been beneficial for staff. There is no
doubt that unionized salaries are higher, although
by how much is not clear. They are clearly
considerably higher in public sector institutions
and according to one commentator unionized
salaries have the effect of pushing non-unionized
salaries upwards.
In the competitive US
environment

admillistrators at 1l01l-llIziOllized illstitutions
(Ileed) to match gains by unionized faculty ill
order to maintain their institution's
representation and stave off consideration of
collective bargailling by their own faculty ...
given that most unionized faculty are found at
State supported colleges and ulliversities it may
be somethillg of a distortioll to draw
comparisons betweell unionized and nonUlliollized colleges since faculty's real
competitors are often civil servants ... without
collective bargainingfacuIty salaries would have
diminished in some proportion as a direct result
of the increasing power of unionized civil
servants

to the award (whether union members or not).
Moreover, recalcitrant employers are legally
obliged to participate in arbitration and to adhere
to an arbitrated decision. Awards or agreements
have an unlimited life and can only be varied
with agreement by both parties.
These
arrangements have placed Australian academic
unions in a relatively strong legal position
(although employers retain the whip hand in
relation to matters defined as 'managerial
prerogative').
It is often wrongly assumed that academic
unionism in Australia began with the 1987 federal
registration of the two national academic unions the Union of Australian College Academics
(UACA) and the Federated Australian University
Staff Association (FAUSA) - in the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC). In fact
there was extensive development of formal union
organisation much earlier.
The pace and depth of this development was
uneven with (not surprisingly) college academics,
former teachers and more junior academics
unionising earlier and in greater numbers than
their more senior counterparts in the more
prestigious traditional universities.

(Drescher and Polishook, 1985, p. 15).
Decisive gains also appear to have been made in
increasing faculty participation in decisionmaking (a somewhat ironic twist given the Yeshiva
decision) (National Education Association, 1985,
pp. 17-30). A typical collective contract will not
only include salary, leave, retirement and related
benefits, but will also include provisions
guaranteeing 'rank-and-file' academic staff
involvement in selecting Heads of Department
and in the recruitment, appointment and
promotion of staff.
AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENTS
The evolution of Australian academic unionism
has been conditioned by many of the same factors
at work in overseas higher education systems but
has spread more rapidly and has (arguably)
gained greater authority. This distinction arises
from the stronger general union culture which
exists in Australia, and the effects of Australia's
centralised industrial relations system. In this
system unions organised at State and Federal
level have monopoly coverage rights (which are
difficult to challenge), and awards and industrial
agreements granted by arbitration tribunals apply
to all workers employed by the employer parties
Vol. 17, No. 2,1992

In 1957 the New South Wales Teachers Federation
(NSWTF) successfully gained a salaries award
from the NSW Industrial Commission for
academics employed at the NSW University of
Technology. Given the absence of any other
formal regulation of academic salaries by the
State the industrial award quickly became a
benchmark for salaries negotiation in other
universities, even though most academic staff
were not union members. The Federal Council of
University Staff Associations of Australia
(FCUSSA) - a national body formed in 1952 which
later became FAUSA in 1962 - was unconvinced
that industrial regulation of salaries was
appropriate. It retained (with some ambivalence)
the view that the scholarly labour of academics
was sui generis and could not be treated as a
conventional
employment
relationship.
Nonetheless from 1957 onwards, no doubt in part
under pressure from the NSW award,
FCUSSA/FAUSA was concerned "to achieve a

nationallllode of salary determination, minimise salary
differentials while at the same time maintaining the
collegial traditions ofacademic life" (O'Brien, 1992, p.
6 and O'Brien, 1990). The Eggleston Report (1964)
on academic salaries laid the foundation for the
development of a national salaries structure.
While endorsing the concept that academic
labour was sui generis the Report nonetheless
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acknowledged that the fixation of salary rates
must have some regard to rates for comparable
professional groups, particularly research
scientists and engineers.
The establishment and subsequent expansion of
advanced education from the mid 1960s saw the
establishment of a new national organisation in
1968 - the Federation of Staff Associations of
Australian Colleges of Advanced Education
(FSAACAE) - to represent the interests of
academic staff in the burgeoning institutes of
technology, teachers' colleges, advanced
education colleges and other specialist vocational
institutes. The Sweeney Report (1969) provided the
basis for a national advanced education structure
(although the authority of State governments over
the advanced education sector lessened its
impact) and proclaimed that the new institutions
were 'equal but different'. Salary rates for
lecturers and senior lecturers were to be the same
as those of traditional university staff.
Further national reviews followed (Eggleston 1970
and Campbell 1973) until finally a permanent
national review and adjustment mechanism was
established in 1974 in the form of the Academic
Salaries Tribunal (AST). This had been actively
sought by FAUSA and FSAACAE. The Tribunal
represented a classic compromise between the
need to provide for a regular independent
assessment of salaries, and the perceived need to
ensure that the special character of academic
work was not diluted by the processes of
industrial arbitration. The Tribunal did not
operate in an adversarial fashion and was
encumbered in several ways:
•

•
•

•
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Its jurisdiction was confined to salary and
related matters only and it could not become
involved in matters such as leave, tenure or
promotion.
It did not provide conciliation or dispute
resolution procedures.
Its decisions were recommendations only
(although it should be noted that most
institutions adopted its scales as Government
funding was determined by Tribunal
decisions).
There was no right of appeal from its
recommendations and Parliament retained
the right to veto its decisions (a prerogative
not available to Parliament in the case of
decisions of the Industrial Relations
Commission).

With the end of higher education's Australian
long boom in 1975, the weaknesses of the AST
became apparent. Its jurisdiction was unable to
deal with the welter of employment and
professional issues arising from the end of the
boom. The sharp contraction in advanced
education left college academics vulnerable to
unilateral funding and employment decisions by
Governments and campus administrations. A
wave of rationalisation washed over the colleges
between 1976 and 1982. At the same time in the
traditional university sector the cessation of
growth saw a rising discontent amidst junior
academic ranks. As the decade progressed
academics identified that the 'arms length'
relationship between the State and Vice
Chancellors/Principals was disappearing.
Increasingly, management and the State were
moving in lock-step to impose bureaucratically
determined adjustment mechanisms to cope with
declining resources (see page 8). Thus there was
a surge of union activity by academics from the
mid 1970s onwards as academic labour sought to
establish a countervailing relationship with the
State via State-sponsored conciliation and
arbitration. A former prominent Vice-Chancellor,
Professor Keith Hancock, describes this
development:

... before the 1970s the staff assqciations did not
perceive themselves as 1l1liollS alld, ill deed,
regarded cOllve/ltional union behaviour as
inconsistent with the way ill which ulliversities
were govemed, emphasizing, as it did,
collegiality and participation. During the 1970s
and 1980s however, they increasingly identified
themselves as entities forfurthering the interests
of staff members ... an important factor was ...
the influence of more union members of staff,
often lacking tenure, to whom more customary
union goals were important ... the process may
also have been fostered by the develop11lent of
more managerial attitudes and practices among
the administrations, this ill turn being
accentuated by the policies of the federal
government and its buffer authorities ... the
associations' becomillg more 111lioll-like with tlte
Ilecessity of getting recognitioll ill the
conciliation mzd arbitratioll system
(Hancock, 1989, p. 114).
The Move to State Industrial Commissions
The issue for academics was how to unionise.
Legal access to the federal tribunal - the AIRC was not possible in the mid-1970s. A 1929 High
Court decision in the State School Teachers case had
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rUled that teachers (and by extension some other
categories of professional workers, including
academics) were not engaged in an 'industry' and
therefore could not be involved in 'industrial
disputes'. This restriction did not apply, however,
in the various State industrial jurisdictions.
college academics was active in seeking to
register Statewide unions in these jurisdictions
and gained awards in Western Australia (1976),
South Australia (1982-83), Queensland (1982-83)
and Victoria (1981-85). These awards covered a
variety of non-salary matters (the State tribunals
refused to become involved with salaries, given
the AST's jurisdictions) including leave, tenure
and regulation of the incidence of contract
employment. FSAACAE changed its name to the
Federation of College Academics (FCA) in 1979
(and later to the Federated Council of Academics
in 1986) and began to play an important coordinating role as the national collective
organisation (McCulloch, 1985).
The move to State tribunals was much slower in
the traditional university sector reflecting the
more conservative culture of FAUSA's local
Branches and the fact that rationalisation was not
as severe as in advanced education. From the mid
1970s onwards FAUSA's local Branches moved to
seek registration in the State tribunals but this
was more of a defensive move (to prevent other
unions from covering traditional university
academics) than a move to regulate conditions of
employment. While local Branches would accede
to FAUSA having industrial authority as a salaries
advocate in the AST they were not supportive of
industrial regulation of other conditions.
Pressure from untenured staff saw the first State
industrial determination registered by a FAUSA
Branch in 1986 - the Monash University Tutors case.
Federal Registration .
The move to State industrial tribunals did not
diminish the need for academics to gain access to
the federal AIRC. There were compelling reasons
as the early 1980s approached to seek national
registration, including:
•

The continuing weakness of the AST whose
continued adherence to the doctrine of sui
ge/leris made it difficult for FCA and FAUSA
to argue that academic pay rates should keep
pace with rates for public servants, teachers
and engineers. The problem was particularly
acute for the college sector as the AST had
abandoned the nexus between university and
college rates in 1976.
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•

The slow pace of expanding State award
coverage which left college academics
vulnerable when the second wave of college
rationalisation commenced in 1982 (the 'Razor
Gang' amalgamations), and which left the
untenured staff in the traditional universities
largely unprotected as per capita funding
rates continued to decline (McCulloch, 1985,
pp. 5-7).

A national approach was needed. The shift
towards this approach was signalled in 1980 on
the political front with the affiliation ofFCA to the
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), and
on the legal front with moves in the High Court
by FAUSA to seek a legal basis for national
registration as a union. The Darvall case sought,
unsuccessfully, to argue that universities were
ancillary to industry and commerce, and that
therefore the work of academics had an incidental
'industrial' character, and was therefore capable
of becoming involved in 'industrial' disputes.
The narrow nature of the FAUSA argument, and
the fact that FAUSA declined an invitation from
the Court to challenge the State School Teachers
case head-on, underlined that traditional
university academics at a senior level still
retained ambivalence about their relationship
with the State's industrial relations apparatus.
Although the High Court rejected the narrow
FAUSA argument it seized the next available
opportunity to overturn the fundamental basis of
the State School Teachers case. In the 1983 ASWU
case it expanded massively the constitutional
definition of 'industrial disputes' to include:

... tize popular meaning of 'industrial disputes'
(wizich) includes disputes between employees
and employers abou t the terllls and cOlzditions of
employment and conditions of work
(McCulloch, 1983, p.1).
This enabled access to the AIRC for a host of
previously excluded categories of worker,
including teachers, social workers and academics.
FeA and FAUSA both made immediate
application for registration - in FCA's case under
the name of the Union of Australian College
Academics (UACA). It was, however, to be
another three and a half years before registration
was achieved, because of further technical and
legal process. The intervening period was
characterised by rising militancy amongst
academics. The election of a Labor Government
in 1983 raised expectations that the pressures on
higher education would abate. Developments
rapidly confounded these expectations. New
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student places were 'marginally' funded, which
increased class sizes and workloads, and
academic staff witnessed the appalling spectacle
of direct Prime Ministerial intervention in the
AST. On 17 April 1984, following a 2 year review,
the Tribunal awarded a 5% academic salary rise.
On June 5, the Tribunal reconvened, and after
refusing to allow substantive argument from FCA
or FAUSA, reversed its earlier decision and
awarded less than half of its original decision,
with the balance to flow a year later. Some weeks
later it became public that the chair of the
Tribunal, Justice Ludeke, had acted on the advice
of a private telephone call from the Prime
Minister. The decision generated work-bans in
NSW institutions, but was later overturned by the
Federal Court (Federation of College Academics,
1984) ..
In 1985 and 1986 there were sporadic outbreaks of
protest, including a number of stoppages and
strikes, about the contract academic labour
system which saw a Statewide agreement reached
between CASA (FCA's Victorian Branch) and
Victorian colleges. The agreement limited nontenured appointments to no more than 25% of the
total academic staff profile. The agreement
underlined the pressure being generated by the
academic 'underclass'. The federal registration of
FAUSA in December 1986 and UACA in February
1987 was long overdue.
Federal Awards
Following federal registration a raft of national
and local federal industrial awards was
established rapidly during 1987, 1988 and 1989.
The first national awards were salaries
agreements for both the university and college
sectors. These simply reflected prevailing rates,
although an important change occurred when
these awards were amended in 1989. The salary
rates set down were no longer prescribed as paid
rates (i.e. the employer was legally unable to pay
above the set rate) but were rather cast as
lIlillilllUI1l rates (i.e. the employer must legally pay
at least the prescribed rate but is free to pay above
this without the intervention of the AIRC). This
has provided universities and colleges with
flexibility to deal with shortages in particular
disciplines, by offering market salary loadings,
and to retain senior academic staff. This change
has been carried over to the new unified salary
structure established in 1991. Salaries provision
by federal award has been augmented by a
further national award - the 1988 Tertiary
Educatio1l Supera1lnuation Award which provides
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3% of salary annually as a compulsory employer
contribution for retirement, in addition to the 14%
contribution provided by the Superannuation
Scheme for Australian Universities (SSAU).
These awards have been jointly established by
UACA and FAUSA.
The other main national award to which UACA
and FAUSA are parties - the 1988 Second Tier
Award - contains a number of punitive provisions
which were initiated by the higher education
employers' association - The Australian Higher
Education Industrial Association (AHEIA). These
include clauses which provide for retrenchment
and redundancy of academic staff, and also
clauses providing for dismissal on the grounds of
ill-health, unsatisfactory performan<;e or serious
misconduct. The award provisions were bitterly
resisted by UACA and FAUSA - including stopwork action in most major cities - but were
eventually imposed by the AIRC following
arbitration hearings in late 1988. It is consistent
with the general pattern of the 1970s and 1980s
that these provisions were jointly sought by the
State and institutional management. Their
continuing alliance fatally undermined whatever
confidence academic staff still had left in collegial
relationships (particularly in traditional
universities). This, combined with hostility to
other aspects of the Dawkins' agenda, helps
explain the militancy and industrial action which
accompanied the 1989-91 award restructuring
dispute.
UACA actively built up a network of federal
enterprise awards dealing with conditions of
employment such as workloads, annual leave,
long service leave, promotion polic)'t
appointment
procedures
and
contract
employment. These awards are Queellsland
Colleges of Advallced Edllcatioll Award 1988,

Australian Fillll, Radio and Televisio1l Sc11001 Award
1988, Nort11el'll Territory University Award 1988,
Australian Maritime College Award 1988, Soutll
Australian CAE Award 1989, Tasmania1l State
Institute of Tecll1lology Award 1989, Victoria1l CAE
Leave Award 1989, Weste1'1l Australia1l College of
Adva1lced Educatio1l Award 1989, University of
Ca1lberra Award 1991. The awards provided legal
protection of long standing conditions but
avoided rigidity by reflecting the different
histories and cultures of each institution. These
were, in turn, buttressed by over 20 local
industrial agreements dealing with institutional
amalgamations which were jointly negotiated by
UACA and FAUSA in 1989-91.
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AWARD RESTRUCTURING

The major achievement of Australian academic
unionism is undoubtedly the 1991 Award
Restl'llcturing Agreement - an undertaking of
immense complexity given that it involved the
merger, on a national basis, of the salaries and
traditions of university and colleges. The
agreement, finalised in July 1991, only came after
months of wrangling within and between the
unions, the AHEIA and the Commonwealth, and
followed two national work stoppages and bans
on students' annual examination results in 1990
(Blackford, 1992; Currie, 1992 and McCulloch,
1991). Finalization of the agreement came at a
time when the Australi'an academic labour
market had moved back into a phase of excess
demand which strengthened the hand of the
academic unions. A 1990 labour market study
has estimated that Australia faces a shortage of up
to 20,000 academic staff based on student growth
projections to the year 2001 (Sloan et al., 1990).
Not only did the agreement provide for
substantial salary hikes it also dealt directly with
two of the key issues which had underpinned the
rise of academic unionism - promotion
opportunities and the incidence of untenured
employment.
A Unified Academic Classification Structure

The dramatic change in the Australian higher
education system wrought by the W11ite Paper had
major industrial relations implications. There
were some 70 or so universities and colleges of
advanced education in 1987 which through
mergers and amalgamations had been reduced to
some 40 or so new institutions by 1991. Almost
all of these new institutions are universities which
have been created by either the merger of CAEs
with 'traditional universities ' (such as the
amalgamation of Melbourne University with the
Melbourne CAE) or the simultaneous merger and
upgrading of former CAEs to form a 'new
university' (such as the upgrading of the former
New South Wales Institute of Technology and its
subsequent merger with Kuringai CAE to form
the University of Technology, Sydney). The
abolition of the binary system and the resultant
Unified National System (UNS) impelled unions
and employers to re-examine the separate salary
rates and classification structures for college and
university academics established by the AST in
1976, and which were carried over in the Federal
AIRC in 1987.
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It was not possible to maintain separate rates and

classifications for college and university academic
staff when the structural basis of separation has
disappeared
it would involve huge
administrative complexity to sustain a former
college salary stream within amalgamated
institutions and would undoubtedly lead to
internal friction and division amongst staff. This
posed acute questions about th.e nature of
academic work and the skills and qualifications
required to perform it. In the UNS two distinct
but complementary academic cultures had been
merged - the culture of the former college system
which entailed a primary emphasis on teaching,
vocational training and the ongoing development
of formal links with the professions and industry,
and the culture of the 'traditional' universities
which was founded on the link between teaching,
research and postgraduate education. This
cultural merger highlighted in its sharpest form
the 'parity of esteem' debate which dominated
Australian higher education planning from the
early 1980s onwards.
Although the unions and the employers
acknowledged early in the award restructuring
negotiations that a new classification and salary
structure should be based on full equality
between the two former sectors, giving effect to
comparable worth was not easy. The autonomy
of individual academic staff and the wide variety
of institutional practices in the former binary
system provided few national points of reference
upon which to rely in designing a new structure.
Many academic staff had never worked in
accordance with defined duty statements;
classification criteria for particular categories of
academic staff had rarely been systematically
committed to paper, and where they had been
there were often substantial variations within and
between institutions. The unified structure
produced for the first time broad standards which
can be applied across the whole higher education
system. These standards ensure that teaching,
research, administration and professional
contributions are primary tasks for all academic
staff. The key to relative seniority within the
academic structure lies not so much in the balance
of these functions as in the intensity and
excellence with which they are performed.
Flowing from this teaching, research and
professional/ consulting contributions should
have broadly equal value. None is more
important than another and none can be
performed well without reference to the others.
Based on these principles the academic award
restructuring
agreement
established
a
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broadbanded five level salary and classific::: tion
structure to replace the previous college and
university arrangements as follows:
..

Level A:
former University Tutor and
Senior Tutors and former College Lecturer III
.. Level B:
former University Lecturers
and College Lecturers II and I
.. Level C:
former University Senior
Lecturers and College Senior Lecturers rr and I
.. Level D:
former University Associate
Professor and College Principal Lecturer
.. Level E:
former University Professors
and College Heads of School
To encourage diversity and flexibility the
agreement left the issue of titles and designations
to institutional processes, but provided broad
classification criteria for appointment and
promotion to each level.
Unifying and Improving Promotion
Opportunities
In the binary system two distinct approaches to
promotion existed. The 'traditional' universities
had an understandable emphasis on the centrality
of research and publications as the basis for
achieving promotion, particularly at Senior
Lecturer level and above. Such an emphasis arose
from the high level of postgraduate effort in these
institutions and the consequent need for
academic staff to have the requisite research
necessary
for
postgraduate
experience
supervision.
Teaching and professional
experience had formal equivalent standing as
promotion criteria but a premium was placed on
research. The CAE sector also gave considerable
weight to research and publications in assessing
promotion applications but gave real effect to the
formal equivalence in value of teaching and
professional contributions as promotion criteria.
The challenge in award restructuring was to
ensure that both approaches to promotion were
kept in balance. To deny in practice the centrality
of teaching and professional experience in
promotion would not only disenfranchise a large
body of former CAE staff but also undermine the
twin objectives of improving the quality of
undergraduate teaching and encouraging the
mobility of staff between institutions and the
professions. On the other hand, to deny the
importance of research and publications would
diminish the international standing of the
Australian higher education system and

68

Australiall Journal of Teacher Educatioll

discourage active postgraduate research at a thne
when higher degree enrolments were Critically
low.
The award restructuring agreement
addressed this problem by establishing a common
set of national guidelines to be used in
determining promotion through the proposed
unified national salary structure. The agreement
suggests that the following criteria should be
applied to promotion applications in broadly
equal measure:
..

Experience and achievement in teaching and
curriculum development.
.. Achievement and experience in research and
scholarship.
.. Contribution to institutional planning and
governance.
.. Contribution to relevant professions and the
wider community, including industry
exchanges and consulting work.
.. Formal qualifications or progress towards
such qualifications.
Given the wide diversity of existing promotion
arrangements and the fact that individual
institutions have different missions within the
UNS the agreement did not seek to prescribe
these criteria but instead required institutions to
evolve new promotion arrangements. The
evolution of new approaches is to be monitored
by the unions and the employers leading to a
review of promotion of a system-wide and
institutional basis at the end of 1993.
The second (and arguably more important)
dimension of the promotion issue was the extent
in any event of promotion opportunities. The
'traditional' university culture had not regarded
appointments at tutor and senior tutor level as
career appointments, preferring to see these staff
(who carry a substantial undergraduate teaching
load) as academic 'apprentices'. Consequently,
very few institutions had provisions for internal
promotion from the tutoring grades to the
lecturing grades. The agreement represented a
major breakthrough in this respect by explicitly
acknowledging that all institutions were required
to evolve promotion processes which provide for
internal promotion from Level A to Level B, Level
B to Level C and .Level C to Level D. This
evolution will also be monitored by the unions
and the employers and will be encompassed by
the proposed 1993 review.

Controlling Untenured Employment
The combination of no-growth in the late 1970s
and inadequately funded growth in the 1980s
created an increasingly large pool of untenured
employment and this long-running sore was
addressed head-on by the award restructuring
agreement. The agreement required that a
system-wide proportion of total academic staff
(measured on an EFT basis including casual
appointments) at Level A in tenured employment
be established at around 30%, and that no more
than 30% of the total academic staff establishment
at a system wide level (including casual staff)
should be in untenured employment. Although
considerable technical work is still required to
refine this framework the targets set out are to be
achieved by 1993 and will yield substantial
benefits for staff and the system as a whole.
Combined
with
improved
promotion
opportunities the incentives for academics
(particularly young female academics) to remain
in higher education will be dramatically
increased. Many institutions will be required to
convert casual positions into fixed-term positions,
and in turn a significant number of junior fixedterm positions should become tenured.
Halting the Salary Decline
Restructuring of the academic salary awards
commenced in mid 1989 and has involved four
distinct salary movements. A 3% increase in
salaries was applied to the old college and
university rates in September 1989 and again in
May 1990. In July 1991 all Australian academics
moved to the unified national salary structure,
but translation to the new scale occurred in two
steps. The first involved an average salary rise of
around 8% in 1991 which is to be followed by a
further average rise of around 1 % in July 1992
when the second step of the translation process
occurred.

the table take account of the general 2.5% wage
rise which flowed to most Australian workers in
late 1991 - academic staff received this rise in
September 1991. When these factors are taken
into account Australian academic salaries have
risen by around 18% between 1989 and the
beginning of 1992, which will rise to about 21 % in
1997 (assuming constant dollars). This has
occurred at a time when the Australian inflation
rate has declined sharply, and is now amongst the
lowest in the developed world.
Much attention was focussed on the lack of
international competitiveness of Australian
academic salaries during the award restructuring
process with Marginson's study (1989) suggesting
that Australian salaries had declined by around
20% relative to salaries in the UK, NZ and the
USA between the late 70s and late 80s. The award
restructuring process appears to have achieved a
major turn-round in the relative competitiveness
of Australian salaries.
Table 5 sets out
comparisons between Australian and US salaries
between July 1989 and September 1991 and
indicates that Australian academics have
improved their position by around 12% relative to
their US counterparts since 1989.
The
improvement at the higher levels has been less
marked (around 9-10%) reflecting the
compression of relativities in the Australian
unified salary structure. This was quite justifiable
given the extensive incidence of allowances and
overaward payments for staff in the professional
salary grades.

These are very large salary rises compared to
general movements in Australian wages and
salaries which have risen by only around 9%
between 1989 and early 1992. Moreover, the new
structure provides for annual incremental
progression and has extended the available range
for future progression. As a consequence the real
value of the salary increase will continue to grow
throughout the 1990s, as can be seen from Table 4.
In reading Table 4 two points should be borne in
mind - the data do not include the two 3% salary
rises of September 1989 and May 1990, nor does
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TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF REAL VALUE OF AWARD RESTRUCTURING
SALARY INCREASES

TABLE 5: COMPARISON OF US AND AUSTRALIAN ACADEMIC SALARIES 1989-1991

(The salary increases have been adjusted to reflect losses, gains and delays in incremental progression
and are in constant July 1991 dollars, but exclude the 3% rises granted in September 1989 and May 1990.)

Position on
Old Scale

Professor
(No increments)
Ass. Professor
(No increments)

TRANSLATION
RISE 1
(23/7/91)
Constant value of
rise in
(%)
($)

6.2
9.6

4188
5507

TRANSLATION
RISE 2
(23/7/92)
Constant value of
rise
(%)
($)

12.1

8182

13.1

7507

FINAL OUTCOME
(23/7/97)
Constant value of
inrise in
(%)
($)
12.1
13.1

8182
7507

Senior Lecturer
(Top of Scale,
Jan 1)

6.3

3103

7.8

3985

10.8

5485

Senior Lecturer
(Top of Scale,
July 1)

7.4

3808

7.8

3985

10.8

5485

5.1

2119

6.7

2904

10.2

4404

Lecturer
(Top of Scale,
Jan 1)
Lecturer
(Top of Scale,
July 1)
Lecturer
(Bottom of Scale,
Jan 1)
Tutor
(Top of Scale,
Jan 1)

6.8

13.8

2.9

2823

4560

788

6.7

12.9

5.7

2904

4657

1604

10.2

10.2

35.7

$88.94M

9.1

15.7

1989

1991

SALARY
($A)

SALARY
CAEs(b)

66,925

70,263

Associate Professor

49,488

52,225

Assistant Professor

41,213

43,300

34,725

37,413

31,113

32,613

74,900

78,638

Associate Professor

55,538

56,088

Assistant Professor

45,138

47,275

36,388

39,763

32,138

33,550

62,138

65,225

Associate Professor

49,066

51,736

Assistant Professor

40,800

42,700

32,863

33,650

31,563

32,475

AND
CLASSIFICATION
TYPE
($A) (a)

4404

10004

$127M

(Federated Council of Academics, 1991, p. 5)

1989 AUSTRALIAN
SALARY IN
UNIVERSITIES AND
(c)

1991 AUSTRALIAN
ACADEMIC SALARY
IN UNIFIED
NATIONAL SYSTEM
1989

AUSTRALIAN
SALARY AS %
OFUS
1991

ALL PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE

4404

Average of Whole
Structure
8.1

us INSTITUTION

73,800

96.0

105.0

Level C(max) 56,375

97.0

107.9

Level C(min) 48,688

101.0 112.4

Level B(min) 39,463

91.0

106.0

Level A(mid) 33,620

92.0

103.1

73,800

85.0

95.0

Level C(max) 56,375

87.0

100.0

Level C(min) 48,688

92.0

103.0

Level B(min) 39,463

86.0

99.0

Level A(mid) 33,620

89.0

100.2

Professor 63,919
Senior Lecturer
48,086
(max)
Senior Lecturer
41,460
(min)
Lecturer
31,259
(min)
Senior Tutor
28,640
(mid)

LevelE

Professor 63,919
Senior Lecturer
(max)
48,086
Senior Lecturer
41,460
(min)
Lecturer
(min)
31,259
Senior Tutor
(mid)
28,640

LevelE

Head of Schoo163,919
Principal Lecturer
(min)
50,228
Senior Lecturer
41,460
(min)
Lecturer I
(min)
31,259
Lecturer HI
(min)
27,138

LevelE

COMPREHENSIVE
INSTITUTIONS
73,800

102.1 113.1

Level D(min) 60,475

102.4 117.0

Level C(max) 48,688

101.7 114.0

Level B(min) 39,463

95.0

117.3

30,340

86.0

93.0

LeveIA(S2)

(American data from National Education Association Almanacs of Higher Education).

US salaries in Australian dollars have been calculated using $A=0.75 $US
Australian salary as at July 1989
Australian salary as at September 1991
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Some caution should be exercised in interpreting
the table. The classification levels of American
and Australian academics are not directly
comparable, and the US salary figures do not
include stipends, merit loadings and payment for
summer semester work. These factors are to
s?me extent offset given that the Australian salary
figures exclude market loadings, responsibility
allowances and payments for professional
consulting work and do not include the second
award restructuring rise due in July 1992.
Marginson's study relied on comparisons only
with US doctoral institutions (where salaries are
higher than average) and (arguably) Table 5 gives
a more accurate picture by encompassing all
public and private US institutions, including
comprehensive universities.
A SHORT REPLY TO TWO CRITICS

The preceding analysis demonstrates that
academic unionism in Australia has provided
substantial benefits for academic staff. These
include:

•
•

•

•

A significant increase in salaries following
award restructuring, and additional
superannuation provision.
A national framework for negotiating
improved
promotion
and
tenure
opportunities at local level, and a new
amalgamated
career
structure.
Implementation of the structure remains a
matter for local negotiation.
The creation of an independent link with the
State apparatus which acts as a counterweight
to the direct and indirect managerial links
Vice-Chancellors had already developed with
the State during the earlier periods of growth
and contraction.
The establishment of legally binding but
diverse agreements at local or Statewide level
guaranteeing minimum standards of annual
leave, sick leave, appointment procedures,
maximum workload ceilings, appeals
processes and the like.

It is against this background that the radical

deregulatory proposals of Professor David
Penington and Dr David Kemp need to be
assessed (Pennington, 1991a, 1991b; Kemp, 1991).
They have developed a model which draws on
the New Zealand Employment Contracts Act and
the deregulatory changes to the role of the New
South Wales Industrial Commission. The legal
monopoly on coverage of academics by unions
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would be removed and academics would choose
whether to be represented by a union - in which
case award regulation would apply - or whether
to negotiate a voluntary individual or collective
contract.
These contracts could
conditions of employment above s
set by
union-sponsored industrial awards or conditions
set below award standards.
On its face the proposal seems a reasonable
attempt to provide individual choice
flexibility in employment conditions but closer
examination reveals that the real intention of such
changes is to fragment academic
.
power and to ensure that future
conditions are dictated by market and U''''''''/,;l::'la!
priorities. The main arguments put by
and Professor Penington to justify
individual contracts, are first, that the cell

industrial relatiolls system supports ever il1f'IW'ci.",
rigidity alld natiollalunijormity, and '''''~v<'u.
the industrial relatiolls system has eroded (;UlleS!lallt1l
ill staff relatiolls.
These arguments ignore the realities of the
award structures. So-called 'national uniformity'
has diminished considerably since academics
gained access to the Federal AIRC. Salary rates
for academics are now minimulll rates, not paid
rates which gives employers the legal right to
negotiate, on an individual basis, extra payments
for academic staff (see page 66). It is therefore
quite clear that the purpose of providing a
'voluntary' system of individual contracts as a
substitute for award salaries is designed to enable
employers to pay below the current award rates.
The intention is to enable individual institutions
the freedom to internally reallocate State funding
for salaries according to fluctuations in supply
and demand.
Moreover, it is simply nonsense to suggest that
awards dealing with other conditions of
employment have imposed 'rigid uniformity'. As
is set out on page 66-7 these awards are highly
variable and reflect the different histories and
practices of particular states or institutions. The
only other major award with national uniform
application is the Second Tier Award which is
punitive in character. This was imposed centrally
on academic staff by the AHEIA, an organisation
which has previously been led by Professor
Penington.
Apparently 'uniformity' is
appropriate if it serves a managerial purpose but
not if it serves a union purpose.
The earlier sections of this paper underline that
the decline of collegiality pre-dates the emergence
VO!. 17 No. 2, 1992

f academic unionism. Moreover, a closer look at
~rofessor Penington's definition of collegiality
.t1",~.,,,,,,,,,,, that his version of it is simply an
'. [abOl'ate assertion of 11Iallagerial prerogative. He
e
that collegial processes involve senior
. cademics (Deans, Heads of Department)
a
'pating in decision-making on behalf of
Faculty or Departmental staff. This
conveniently ignores the fact that Deans and
Heads are increasingly appointed by central
administration (not by faculty processe~), and
constitute less than 10% of the academiC staff
The
establishment in most institutions.
of budgeting to a Faculty and
departmental level has increased the managerial
role of Deans and Heads and has actually
strengthened central management authority.
Deans and Heads when directly administering
large pools of funds must be more accountable to
the central management.
Developments in New Zealand indicate that the
Penington/Kemp approach will penalise less
organised sections of the academic labour for~e,
erode minimum rates of pay, impact more heaVily
on junior academics and increase managerial
authority (Street, 1991). Ironically, it would also
further erode the Idea of the University by
differentiating salaries and conditions according
to market signals (particularly if allied to
vouchers or market-based fees as principal
sources of funding) which would value classics,
philosophy, literature and the liberal arts less
highly than more marketable vocational or
professional disciplines.
Today we are moving towards a more
decentralised industrial relations system. UACA,
FAUSA and NSW Teachers Federation now
represent around 65% of Australian academics
(approximately 18,000 members) and are well
placed to respond to a decentralised environment.
The unions are strong, have wide membership
support and a commitment to flexible negotiation
but vigorous industrial tactics. Managers of
institutions should understand that there is a
difference between decentralisatioll (which retains
the central role of unions as negotiating
instruments at local, State and national level) and
deregulation which will undermine unionism and
erode standards.
Embracing the Kemp/
Penington philosophy will lead to confrontation
in the academic workplace. But for institutions
which recognise the role and substantial
achievements of academic unions, the 1990s will
provide an opportunity to negotiate more flexible
and rewarding working conditions on campus.
The raft of local enterprise awards negotiated by
Vol. 17, No. 2,1992

the academic unions in the late 1980s gives lie to
any suggestion that academic unions are
incapable of an enterprise focus.
But the unions insist that future agreements
complement, rather than destroy, the minimum
award standards UACA and FAUSA have so
painstakingly built up.
ENDNOTE

1.

In this paper the term State is used to denote
either all forms of Government authority
and structure or the regional level of
Government in the Australian federal
system, depending on the contents.
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